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1I. Introduction
Mass toxic torts litigation is a phenomenon that, since its serious emergence in the United
States in the 1980s, has both characterized popular conceptions of class action practice 
and flavored the broader debate over national tort reform.  Demonstrative litigation such 
as In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation1 and In re Three Mile Island 
Litigation2 are flagship toxic exposure cases involving class action proceedings on behalf 
of thousands of individuals claiming damages for chronic exposure to a variety of 
harmful substances released into the environment.
This paper advances the proposition that mass toxic tort litigation has been the 
predominant driver of class action rule reform in the Unites States. Through three distinct 
phases of proposals to reform Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
judicial and academic attitude to the certification of mass toxic torts has influenced the 
reform debate in radically different ways – initially by providing the catalyst for efforts to 
reform Rule 23; then as a dampener against significant reforms to Rule 23 in the wake of 
mass toxic tort “settlement-only” classes; and ultimately as an explanation for the 
comparatively modest reforms presently before Congress. The common theme 
throughout the three “Rounds” of reform is that the trends and developments in mass 
toxic tort litigation have determined the pace and substantive outcome of class action rule 
reform in the United States. The fact that Rule 23 remains standing in what is effectively 
its original 1966 format supports a central contention of this paper, namely, that any 
meaningful change to class action practice designed to accommodate the legal and ethical 
1 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
2
 In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
2challenges posed by aggregate toxic exposure claims lies in the collective hands of 
Congress.
Part II of this paper provides a working definition of the mass toxic tort by examining the 
key characteristics of this species of litigation, including a discussion of the scientific 
difficulties associated with establishing causation in such litigation, and the procedural 
tensions arising out of the emergence of multiple-incident mass toxic torts.
Part III examines the early proliferation of mass toxic torts in the 1980s and the volume 
pressures that motivated litigants and ultimately the courts to bring such claims as class 
actions. The subsequent calls for class action rule reform comprised “Round One” of the
three-part reform “contest” that pitched mass toxic torts against the present procedural 
mechanisms for bringing aggregates claims.
Part IV outlines the emergence of the future-claimants mass toxic tort class action, 
plunging the Advisory Committee into a headlong consideration of the ethical and legal 
implications of determining “futures” in the context of a settlement-only class action. 
Accordingly, “Round Two” of the continuing battle between mass toxic torts and Rule 23 
was characterized by a concern that such claims should be curbed in light of their 
controversial application in toxic exposure cases, together with the unanticipated effects 
of rule reform on settled areas of practice outside the mass toxic tort context.
Part V considers the current proposals to reform Rule 23 which were submitted by the 
United States Supreme Court to Congress on March 27, 2003. Although the proposals are 
largely procedural as opposed to substantive in nature, they arguably present a host of 
3potential unintended consequences that, although ventilated before the Advisory 
Committee, have not deterred the adoption of the proposals by the Supreme Court.
Part VI analyses the current proposals and suggests that, in the context of the history of 
class action rule reform, “Round Three” is likely to result in a rejection of the 
amendments to Rule 23. The present amendments unmistakably present opportunities for 
unintended consequences effecting class action practice outside of the mass toxic tort 
context. More importantly - perhaps fatally to the success of the proposals - they do not 
squarely address the myriad of potential legal and ethical issues emerging from the mass 
toxic tort phenomenon. That is a task beyond the limited capacity of rule reform, and the 
time is ripe for Congressional intervention to deal with aspects of the mass toxic tort 
phenomenon. The present attempt to administratively deal with the resilient flows of 
asbestos litigation by embracing a national privately-financed trust may be a product of 
the lessons learned from three protracted rounds of class action rule reform, and the 
growing exigency of Congressional intervention.
II. The Modern Conception of a Mass Toxic Tort
A. General Characteristics of Mass Toxic Torts
While no uniform definition of a “massive toxic tort” has been developed beyond its 
colloquial denotation, the term is consistently understood to involve groups of hundreds, 
or even thousands, of individuals who have suffered harm as a result of toxic exposure.3
3 See James W. Elrod, The Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Toxic Pollution Torts, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 
243 (1988) (“Toxic tort cases may be generally characterized as involving the breach of a legal duty 
resulting in the proximate causation of damages or personal injury by exposure to a toxic or poisonous 
substance. The definition quoted above is restricted to claims for personal injury. Although toxic 
(poisonous) torts should by definition involve ‘poisoning,’ the restrictive definition cited above should be 
4Mass toxic tort litigation encompasses a broad range of claims asserted by individuals 
exposed to toxic substances. Those substances are often chemicals (including man-made 
fibers such as asbestos), but can include radiation or even naturally occurring bacteria or 
similar pathogens.4 The typical toxic tort claim involves hundreds or possibly thousands 
of individuals alleged to have been exposed on a chronic basis to low levels of a toxic 
substances. The sheer number of individual claims, together with a host of other factual 
and legal issues peculiar to the mass toxic tort, present extraordinary challenges to the 
courts, the litigants, and their lawyers.5
The central distinguishing characteristic of mass toxic tort cases is that they nearly 
always involve disease, as opposed to traumatic injury. Typical exposure circumstances 
involve low-level, chronic exposures, rather than acute, high-dosage situations. The 
injuries commonly claimed are complex diseases of uncertain etiology, often with long 
latency periods - such as cancer - although plaintiffs will often assert that more common 
conditions (such as allergies, fatigue, learning disabilities and various cardiac problems) 
are the product of their exposure. As Professor Fisher has helpfully noted, “genuine”
mass toxic torts possess a range of common characteristics, although signature 
characteristics include: (1) geographically widespread exposure to potentially harmful 
agents, (2) a large or indeterminate number of plaintiffs, (3) exposure to toxic substances 
over long time periods, even generations, (4) circumstances of exposure often differ 
greatly between claimants, (5) scientific obstacles complicate asserted theories of 
expanded to include property damage. Toxic pollution torts often involve property or economic damage 
claims that are tied to the personal health risks of toxic contamination.”).
4 Joseph C. Kearfott, et al, Case Management and Health Claims in Toxic Tort Litigation, SG084 ALI-
ABA 127, 131.
5 Id. (“As an example of the importance of these challenges, a study by the United States Department of 
Justice showed that plaintiffs’ counsel have found investing in toxic tort cases to have produced some of 
the richest returns among all types of civil litigation cases.”). Id. n.2.
5causation, (6) frequently it is difficult or even impossible to link a particular defendant’s 
conduct to a particular plaintiff’s injuries or increase risk, (7) it may also be difficult to 
determine the number of potentially responsible defendants and their relative culpability, 
if any, (8) the large number of individual claims results in multiple litigations that stretch 
court resources and create significant transactional costs, including large awards of legal 
fees, and (9) such litigation threatens the financial ability of defendant companies -
possibly even entire industries - to respond to traditional damage awards.6
To the extent that there exist prototypical examples of mass toxic tort litigation, perhaps 
the most demonstrative cases include In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation7
and In re Three Mile Island Litigation.8
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation was a class action lawsuit brought by 
Vietnam Veterans and their family members against seven chemical companies for 
injuries allegedly caused by exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides in Vietnam. 
More than 200,000 veterans joined the class action claming a large number of diseases 
6
 See the discussion of the court in Ashley v. Abbott Laboratories, 789 F. Supp. 552, 562 (1992).
7 Clifford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes in the Current Common 
Law Toxic Tort System, 9 Buff. Envt’l L.J. 35, 155 (“The Agent Orange litigation was recognized as 
extraordinary both by the trial court and the Second Circuit, which stated: “This action is ‘sui generis, and 
national in its proportions’ involving an extraordinary consultation of facts, parties, and pleadings.” One of 
the major factors on which the court based its decision to certify a class in the Agent Orange case was the 
fact that the primary defense in that litigation was the “government contract” defense. The defendants 
claimed that since the product was manufactured under contract to the government specifications, the 
private defendants were therefore relieved from liability. Even under these circumstances, the court noted 
that it was treating the case before it as an exception to the general rule that mass tort situations do not 
generally lend themselves to class action treatment.”).
8 Id. at 156 (“The Three Mile Island Litigation involved a single incident with an identifiable source of 
exposure of a known, measured dangerous substance to an identifiable and geographically limited group of 
people. Even with these certainties, the court that certified that class has indicated upon reconsideration that 
certification was really not appropriate.”).
6related to Agent Orange. On May 7, 1984, a settlement was reached in which the 
manufacturers of Agent Orange agreed to pay approximately $180 million.9
In re Three Mile Island Litigation arose when, on March 28, 1979, Reactor 2 at the Three 
Mile Island nuclear power plant suffered a partial meltdown. Within weeks attorneys had 
filed a class action suit against Metropolitan Edison Company (a subsidiary of General 
Public Utilities) on behalf of all businesses and residents within 25 miles of the plant. 
Over 2,000 personal injury claims were filed, with plaintiffs claiming a variety of health 
injuries caused by gamma radiation exposure. The Pennsylvania district court quickly 
consolidated the claims into ten test cases. Over the next 15 years, the case went to the 
Supreme Court and back, and through various district and appeals courts.10
B. The Signature Characteristic of Mass Toxic Torts: Causation
Mass toxic tort cases give rise to characteristic evidentiary issues, including those 
surrounding evidence of scientific opinion, particularly in the context of the scientific and 
legal requirements of causation.11 Even if the presence of disease is undisputed, proof of 
medical causation can be scientifically complicated in toxic exposure situations.12 The 
courts have been reluctant to hold defendants liable until a statistically significant number 
of individuals have been injured or until science has been afforded the time (and 
9
 Deborah Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain, 25 (2000).
10
 See excerpt from the official court summary of Judge Rambo’s decision at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/tmi.html (last visited May 2, 2003).
11
 E. Donald Elliott, Introduction to Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. 
L. J. 1355 (1985).
12 See also Kearfott, supra note 4 at 163 (“Where actual disease is not present, plaintiffs have increasingly 
pursued ambitious theories of recovery based on exposure to toxic chemicals alone. Historically, three 
‘exposure alone’ theories of recovery that have been particularly important are: fear of future illness; 
increased risk of future illness; and medical monitoring or surveillance. More recently, claims have also 
been based on what has been described as ‘Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome’.”).
7resources) to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the toxins.13 As a result, a
number of courts and tort scholars have suggested that as a matter of fairness and equity, 
the common law tort probability standard of “fifty percent plus” be relaxed when trying 
to prove causation in the mass toxic tort context.14 Indeed, it has been persuasively 
argued that the basic “impossibility” of proving individual causation in mass toxic tort 
cases is what distinguishes them from classic mass tort lawsuits.15
The difficulty in proving causation in a mass toxic tort cases arises, primarily, because of 
the latency of the claimed diseases16 and because the plaintiff may have been exposed to 
multiple toxins that could have caused that disease. 17 Population-based probability 
estimates do not speak to probability of causation in any one case, and the estimate of 
relative risk is an extrapolation of the studied population, not of an individual’s 
circumstances. In many instances of disease, such as cancer and other cell mutations, the 
condition itself provides no physical evidence of the causative origin, such that direct 
observation of individual victims provides little or no evidence of causation. Litigants are 
forced rely on epidemiological evidence - based on the study of populations, not 
individuals - and must seek to establish associations between alleged causes and effects 
13
 This reluctance has been at least in part encouraged by aggressive arguments from defense attorneys 
against class certification in the face of weak causation evidence, see Patrick Lysaught, 67 Def. Couns. J. 
165, 166 (2000) (“One of the often-cited problems with mass tort litigation involving exposure to, or 
ingestion of, chemicals, implants or drugs is that the science has not caught up with the litigator. If no 
scientific and medical support exists for their claims, plaintiffs ought not be in court. … However, ‘junk 
science’ claims continue to make it through the courthouse doors, and defendants and their counsel need to 
be ready.”).
14
 Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 
269 (1991).
15
 Fisher, supra note 7 at 126 (“The basic impossibility of proving individual causation distinguishes classic 
common law toxic tort cases from ordinary personal injury lawsuits.”).
16 Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle of Futures Cases in Tort, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 965, 
981 (2002) (“However, it is difficult to prove in a toxic exposure case, both because of the latency problem 
and because the plaintiff may have been exposed to multiple toxins that could have caused her disease.”).
17
 Id.
8by either comparing the incidence of exposure across sick and healthy populations or by
comparing the disease across exposed and unexposed populations.18 While these 
scientific correlations may lend weight to an inference of causation, in any individual 
case epidemiology will not amount to conclusive proof.19
C. Distinguishing Single- and Multiple-Incident Mass Toxic Torts
A distinction may be drawn within mass toxic tort litigation between the “single-
incident” case in which a group of individuals has been simultaneously exposed to the 
same or similar toxic material in a well-defined time period, and the “multiple-incident”
case in which individuals within the group may have had different levels of exposure to a 
myriad of toxic substances over a longer, less well-defined period.
In the single-incident case, such as In re Three Mile Island Litigation, the number of 
persons injured is finite, and their identities are relatively easy to determine. Further, all 
claimants share common exposure (including almost identical characteristics of time, 
place and cause of injury). In contrast, multiple-incident cases, such as In re Agent 
Orange Product Liability Litigation, involve exposure over many years and a variety of
circumstances, with the injury often occurring years after first exposure, further 
complicating issues of causation. While both single-and multiple- incident mass toxic tort 
actions strain the existing judicial mechanisms for claim resolution, the single-event type 
is usually easier to resolve through existing mechanisms of claim aggregation, such as 
18
 Fisher, supra note at 126 (“However, in an individual case, epidemiology cannot conclusively prove 
causation. It can only estimate certain probability that a randomly selected case of disease was one that 
would not have occurred without exposure or the increased risk of the exposed population.”).
19
 Id.
9existing federal rules for bringing class action proceedings. Claims arising from multiple 
events present additional conceptual and procedural difficulties.20
D. Procedural Tensions Presented by Multiple-Incident Mass Toxic Torts
The case-by- case adjudication of mass toxic torts through the courts is unquestionably 
inefficient and expensive.21 A recent study concluded that the disposition of all currently 
pending asbestos cases for both personal injury and property damages, if treated in the 
traditional course of litigation, would require approximately 150 judge years.22 Reliance 
on individual litigation, or even non-class aggregation, means enormous delay and court 
congestion.23 It may jeopardize the prospect that resources will be available to 
compensate all victims, leaving those who come late to the queue with no remedy at all.24
It is certainly arguable that in the absence of any legislative solution to mass toxic tort 
problem, Congress has effectively forced the courts to adopt diverse, innovative, and 
often nontraditional judicial management techniques to reduce the burden of this species 
20 See discussion in Norman M. Hobbie, et al, Multi-Plaintiff Toxic Tort Litigation, 215-JUN N.J. Law. 44, 
45-46 (2002).
21
 A Rand Corporation study in 1983 of asbestos litigation found that over 60 percent of total costs were 
expended for administrative costs, primarily attorneys’ fees. See Donald Elliott, Why Courts? Comment on 
Robinson, 14 J. LEG STUD. 799, 802 (1985). Further, a Rand Corporation study in 1992 indicated that, 
since the federal Superfund law was enacted in 1980 to help clean toxic waste sites, insurers have spent an 
average of almost 90 percent of their Superfund related outlays on legal fees and related costs, not on 
cleanup. See Edward Felsenthal, No Exit: Mass-Liability Suits Can Trap Minor Players That Prefer to 
Settle, WALL ST. J., Jan 4, 1993, at A1.
22
 State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d 300, 303-04 (W.Va. 1996) (citing Jack B. 
Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 140 (1995).
23 Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 923 (1998).
24
 As Professor Cooper has suggested with respect to the absence of class treatment: “It may fail utterly to 
achieve the distinctive treatment of each individual case according to its distinctive merits, as hundreds or 
even thousands of victims become nominal ‘clients’ of attorneys who settle their inventories of cases in 
large batches with no effective constraint on the terms or allocation of the settlements. The only remedies 
available are those awarded in traditional litigation based on unique events that affect no more than a few 
people. The transaction costs are staggering; it is common to observe that something like two-thirds of the 
money devoted to asbestos litigation goes to the costs of litigation, leaving barely one-third for victim 
compensation.” Cooper, supra note 23 at 923.
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of litigation that has typically threatened to paralyze  active dockets.25 In order to conserve 
the time and resources of the court, judges and academics have traditionally urged that 
related toxic tort claims be processed together in an aggregate fashion.26 Unsurprisingly 
in this context, the “opt-out” class action mechanism, fashioned by Rule 23(b)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and many state rule equivalents), has become the most 
frequently used vehicle for plaintiffs seeking to certify class actions in toxic tort 
litigation. The emergence of this trend towards mass toxic tort aggregation - together with 
the legal and ethical issues triggered by that approach - have created a history of calls for 
potential reforms of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This paper outlines the current 
proposals for such reform in the context of a tradition of tension between mass toxic tort 
litigation and contemporary mechanisms for claim aggregation via Rule 23.
III. “Round One” Reforms: The Emergence of Mass Toxic Tort Litigation 
Triggers Calls for Class Action Rule Reform
A. The Influx of Mass Toxic Tort Claims in the 1980s
The 1980s saw the first serious wave of mass toxic tort suits as an identifiable species of 
litigation.27 Consumers of drugs and medical devices, and others exposed to toxic 
substances, sued manufacturers for injuries allegedly associated with those products. 
Typically, these cases were brought against one manufacturer that produced a particular 
25 See Ortiz v. Fiberboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (stating that asbestos litigation “defies 
customary judicial administration” and calls for national legislation).
26
 Hobbie, supra note 20 at 45 (“In order to conserve the time and resources of the court, most judges 
believe that related tort claims should be processed together.”)
27
 However, the prospect of large scale mass tort litigation was recognized even earlier - by the mid 1970s, 
calls were already being made to reform class action practice. See Hensler, supra note 9 at 25, who notes 
that the Advisory Committee “flirted with some of the proposals”, but then deliberately put the matter to 
one side.
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device or a group of manufacturers that produced products containing a particular 
substance. Because these products were widely marketed, they had been used by 
thousands of people - or sometimes hundreds of thousands - many of whom came
forward once litigation began, claiming injury to themselves or their relatives. In some 
instances, thousands of lawsuits alleging the same facts and legal violations were brought 
in a single jurisdiction, ordinarily where the exposure had taken place.28
When brought as individual claims, courts found it difficult to handle the rapid increase 
in their caseloads triggered by the proliferation of mass toxic tort claims (which were 
rarely accompanied by proportionate increases in judicial resources to manage such
cases). Faced with this pressure of excessive volume, litigants - and thus courts -
increasingly utilized the class action mechanism to avoid duplicative litigation.29 Through 
the use of the class action in mass toxic tort litigation, courts had the ability to bring 
numerous parties into one courtroom, preside over one trial - on all, or some, of the 
common issues - and dispose of the matter in a way that was binding on all class 
members.
28 Id. at 25 (“For example, tens of thousands of asbestos lawsuits were filed during the 1970s and 1980s, 
many of them in a few jurisdictions where the workers who had been exposed to asbestos had labored. In 
other instances, the lawsuits were dispersed because consumers were spread across the country, and the 
companies that were sued were forced to respond to large numbers of claims in many different state and 
federal courts.”).
29
 Several perceived advantages to certifying a class action were instrumental in triggering an influx of 
mass toxic tort claims. First, class actions eliminated the need for hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs to 
repeat the presentation of evidence on similar issues, thereby increasing judicial efficiency and reducing 
costs. Second, class actions achieved global resolution of similar mass toxic tort claims within one 
proceeding. Third, class actions allowed for an even distribution of damages among class members, thereby 
alleviating some of the problems associated with the race to the courthouse doors. See Mandi L. Williams,
The History of Daubert and its Effect on Toxic Tort Class Action Certification, 22 Rev. Litig. 181, 200.
12
B. Initial Reluctance to Certify Mass Toxic Tort Classes
Despite the perceived potential of Rule 23 to deliver efficiencies in the administration of 
the emerging mass toxic tort phenomenon, class action treatment was initially rejected by 
the courts because such cases were thought to lack commonality on questions of damages 
(illnesses and injuries) and circumstances of exposure history.30 This initial judicial 
reluctance to mass toxic tort certification was, at least in part, a product of the history of 
Rule 23. The Advisory Committee did not foresee the scale or range of litigation that was 
unleashed by the Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out damages class provision. Certainly, there was no 
expectation that the rule would be used in the context of dispersed mass toxic torts, a 
concept that the committee could not have been overtly familiar with. The Advisory 
Committee was, however, aware of mass accident cases, but chose to expressly exclude 
those types of claims from Rule 23 treatment:
“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not 
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, 
not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present, 
affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action 
conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple 
lawsuits separately tried.” 31
30 Lewis C. Sutherland, et al, Class Certification for Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims, SG084 ALI-
ABA 1 (“Thus, the early view of the Advisory Committee was that for mass torts individual issues would 
overwhelm class-wide issues, and as a result the utility and efficiency of the class device would be lost.”).
31
 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) and see Sutherland, supra note 30 at 3, noting that the Advisory Committee 
note is specifically addressed to class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3) which requires a demonstration 
13
In the mass toxic tort arena, Rule 23(b)(3) was certainly interpreted consistently with the 
Advisory Committee mandate.32 The denial of class certification for mass toxic torts 
cases was typically based upon a finding that individual issues would predominate. 33
Many of the early mass toxic tort claims, particularly those involving environmental 
exposure, also included allegations of property damage and residential exposure. The 
time and the duration of the alleged exposure typically varied between class members. 
The defendants’ conduct usually changed over time, so did the identity of the defendants. 
Thus, most courts concluded that a class action was not well-suited for mass toxic tort 
cases because no individual set of operative facts would establish liability and no single 
proximate cause applied equally to each putative class member. For these reasons, courts 
frequently exercise their discretion to decline class certification of mass toxic tort claims.
that issues common to the class “predominate” over individual issues. The early view of the Advisory 
Committee was that for mass toxic torts individual issues would overwhelm class-wide issues, and as a 
result the utility and efficiency of the class device would be lost. Moreover, as at least one commentator has 
noted, one of the apparent purposes of the Rule 23 was to enable meritorious litigation (such as securities 
and civil rights actions) that would not otherwise occur due to the limited size of each individual claim. 
This enabling function is less critical to tort claims because “tort claimants do not need that extra boost 
because they already have access to legal services by way of contingency fee arrangements.”
32
 Initial attempts to certify mass tort classes under the newly revised Rule 23 - even before the deluge of 
mass toxic tort cases in the early 1980s - were rejected based on the concerns expressed in the Advisory 
Committee. See, for example, Harrigan v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (rejecting class 
certification for class consisting of all paralyzed veterans injured by negligent urological surgery at 
Veterans Administration hospitals). Similarly, even when a trial court certified a mass tort class, the 
appellate courts usually reversed. For example, in 1981, a California district court certified the first Dalkon 
Shield class action, but was later reversed by the Ninth Circuit. In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal.), modified, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (vacating district court decision to certify a 
class of all women injured as a result of Dalkon Shield IUD). Similarly, also in 1981, a Missouri district 
court certified a class of all persons injured by the collapse of two skywalks at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in 
Kansas City, but this certification was later reversed by the Eighth Circuit. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 
F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), rev’d, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
33
 Sutherland, supra note 30 at 9 (“In complex, mass toxic tort accidents, where no one set of operative facts 
establishes liability, no single proximate cause equally applies to each potential class member and each 
defendant, and individual issues outnumber common issues, the district court should properly question the 
appropriateness of a class action for resolving the controversy.”.
14
C. The Agent Orange “Breakthrough”: First Phase of Mass Toxic Tort 
Certifications
By the mid-1980s, as the number of mass toxic tort cases mounted, trial and appellate 
courts had begun to reconsider the wisdom of the Advisory Committee’s admonition.34 It 
was the In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation 35 case, brought by Vietnam
veterans alleging injuries resulting from their exposure to dioxin, that proved to be the 
watershed event in the use of Rule 23 for mass toxic tort litigation. This case represented 
the first time that a court certified (and appeal court affirmed) a massive toxic exposure 
class - potentially millions of individuals - who alleged injuries of varying severity and 
types, incurred under similar but not identical circumstances.36 The settlement of the 
veterans’ claims in 1984, for $180 million, attracted widespread professional and 
academic attention.37
Similar significant decisions followed. In the 1988 decision of Sterling v. Velsicol 
Chemical Corp.,38 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the certification of a toxic 
tort class action in which plaintiffs alleged both property damages and personal injuries 
resulting from hazardous chemical releases associated with the defendant’s landfill. The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s class certification order because it found that the 
34 Reference to AC Note above. Citation to follow.
35 See Advisory Committee note, supra note 31.
36
 In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (certifying the class), 
aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding the certification and rejecting other grounds for appeal). 
Defendants attempted to overturn Judge Weinstein’s certification immediately after he issued it, claiming 
abuse of discretion by the trial judge, but the appellate court rejected this request. In re “Agent Orange,” 
725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984).
37
 See discussion in Hensler, supra note 9 at 25 and accompanying footnotes.
38
 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
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cause of the particular “disaster” in this case was a single course of conduct which was 
equally applicable to all of the plaintiffs. Each of the class members lived in the vicinity 
of the landfill and allegedly suffered damages from ingesting the same contaminated 
water.39
A few other courts have reached similar decisions regarding the certification of property 
damage claims.40 The general posture of these decisions was an attempt by the judiciary 
to take advantage of perceived efficiencies associated with class treatment of aggregated 
claims. As for defendants, while they had hitherto generally opposed certification of a 
mass toxic tort class, as more such cases were filed against them, experimentation with 
class actions as a mechanism to create global settlements tentatively began.41 Moreover, 
as plaintiff attorneys continued to file for class certification in asbestos and other toxic 
39
 The appeal court upheld certification of a toxic tort case using the following language: “… the problem 
of individualization of issues is often cited as a justification for denying class action treatment in mass tort 
accidents. While some courts have adopted this justification in refusing to certify such accidents as class 
actions, numerous other courts have recognized the increasingly insistent need for a more efficient method 
of disposing of a large number of lawsuits arising out of a single disaster or single course of conduct. . . 
[When] the cause of the disaster is a single course of conduct which is identical for each of the plaintiffs, a 
class action may be the best suited vehicle to resolve such a controversy.” Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical 
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
40
 Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 203 F.R.D. 254 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (nuisance and negligence claims based on 
property contamination with cement kiln dust); Boggs v. Divested Atomic Corp., 141 F.R.D. 58, 67 (S.D. 
Ohio 1991). In Cook v. Rockwell International Corp., the district court approved class certification of a 
plaintiff class alleging property damages arising from historical chemical and radiation contamination at the 
Rocky Flats Arsenal. The court stated as part of its predominance analysis under Rule 23(b)(3): “plaintiffs 
have demonstrated that this case presents many common issues of law and fact, including whether the 
operation of Rocky Flats constitutes an ultra hazardous activity; whether defendants exercised reasonable 
care to prevent the release of hazardous radioactive and nonradioactive materials from Rocky Flats; what 
materials were released, in what quantities; what caused the releases; what precautions to avoid emissions 
were taken; whether the geographic dispersion of the releases in the surrounding environment was 
reasonably foreseeable; and whether defendants engaged in intentional, reckless, willful, or wanton 
conduct.”
41 The penultimate examples of this experimentation are the Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 117 S. Ct. 
2231 (1997) asbestos personal injury settlement class overturned by the Supreme Court in 1997, and the In 
re Asbestos Litig. (“Ahearn”) 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1998); cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 118 S. Ct. 2339 (June 22, 1998) asbestos personal injury settlement class overturned by 
the Supreme Court in 1999. As evidenced by these two enormous cases, in recent years there has been 
partial retrenchment from the expansive use of class actions in mass tort cases both in the litigation and in 
the settlement context.
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tort cases42 as well as other mass personal injury suits,43 it appeared that the barrier to 
class certification presented by the 1966 Advisory Committee’s caution was at last about 
to fall.44 Trial courts began to demonstrate a greater willingness to experiment with class 
actions for mass toxic tort and environmental litigation,45 and commentary at the time 
seemed to support the use of Rule 23 to facilitate the efficient disposition of mass toxic 
tort litigation. Professor Charles Alan Wright summarized his views in court in the 
following way:
“I was an ex officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when 
Rule 23 was amended, which came out with an Advisory Committee Note saying 
that mass torts are inappropriate for class certification. I thought then that was 
true. I am profoundly convinced now that that is untrue. Unless we can use the 
class action and devices built on the class action, our judicial system is simply not 
going to be able to cope with the challenge of the mass repetitive wrong ...”46
42 In 1990, a class of asbestos workers was certified in the Eastern District of Texas, Cimino v.
Raymark Industries, 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), which had certified the first asbestos class
action, Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff’d, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.
1986), five years earlier.
43 In 1988, a mass tort class action alleging property damages due to a Shell Oil company explosion
was filed in state court in Louisiana. Removed to federal court, it was certified in 1991. In re Shell Oil
Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. La. 1991). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the certification.
Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992).
44
 See, for example, Bruce Neilson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right? Suggested Revisions of 
Rule 23 to Allow for More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 Harvard Journal on 
Legislation 393 (1988).
45
 Sutherland, supra note 30 at 8 “During the last 20 years or so, trial courts - led initially by federal district 
courts and more recently by a few state courts - have demonstrated a greater willingness to experiment with 
class actions for toxic tort and environmental litigation.”
46
 Transcript of Oral Argument, In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1984), quoted in 
Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions 17.06, at 20 (3d ed. 1992). Somewhat 
similarly, Judge Weinstein offered the following observations about the Committee Note: “As authority for 
this warning against attempts to use class actions in torts, the note cites an article [I] wrote as a law 
professor. As a judge [I have] been forced to ignore this indiscretion when faced with the practicalities of 
mass tort litigation. In the earlier 1960s we did not fully understand the implications of mass tort demands 
17
D. Judicial Innovation Facilitates Mass Toxic Tort Certifications
As mass toxic tort certifications continued to emerge, so did criticism of the ability of 
Rule 23 to properly accommodate them. Squeezing the mass toxic tort into existing 
procedural mechanism for the aggregation of claims created pressure on judges to 
demonstrate judicial innovation in their efforts to accommodate the burdens of thousands 
of mass toxic tort filings. Many judges saw class treatment in the mass toxic tort context 
as essential to avoid the “unconscionable possibility that large numbers of plaintiffs who 
are not first in line at the courthouse door will be deprived of a practical means of 
redress.”47 Indeed, Judge Williams wrote an article forecasting the possible demise of 
mass tort class actions, predicting that “until Congress addresses these questions by 
enacting comprehensive federal products liability law ... the inequities and shortcomings 
of the present system require that we judges work in an innovative fashion, adapting 
aspects of the current system to address these challenging problems.”48
Judge Williams’ forecast proved true. Asbestos litigation became the prime area in which 
federal judges used innovation to achieve essentially substantive goals.49 In 1985, Judge 
Rubin urged the Fifth Circuit to adopt federal common law principles in asbestos cases to 
guard against the risk cited by Judge Williams - that repeated awards of damages would 
on our legal system.” Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 
1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269, 288.
47
 In 1981 Judge Spencer Williams highlighted the problem as he oversaw personal injury suits brought by 
users of the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device. He certified a nationwide mandatory class action for 
punitive damages and a statewide Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action for compensatory damages for 
California users of the Dalkon Shield. Although not a toxic exposure case, Judge Williams appreciated the 
prospect of burgeoning mass toxic tort litigation, and saw Rule 23 as the key to a “cure”. The national 
certification was rejected by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. See discussion in Richard L. Marcus, Symposium 
Mass Torts: Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2009, 2014 (2000).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2015 (“Judge Williams was right about judicial innovation; … the courts have been ‘remarkably 
inventive’ in addressing the problems of mass tort litigation with existing procedural tools.”).
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not only add no deterrent effect to the enormous compensatory liability borne by asbestos 
producers but would also create a risk that later plaintiffs would receive nothing.50 Calls 
for judicial innovation to meet the pressures of mass toxic tort litigation continued, as did 
the practice of courts becoming “remarkably inventive” in addressing the problems of 
mass toxic tort litigation with existing procedural tools.51 Such efforts were 
demonstrative of the pressures exerted by the steady flow of toxic tort litigation and the 
consequent judicial innovation aimed at identifying a solution. What emerges from this 
brief survey is a clear picture of federal mass tort litigation plagued by a number of 
pressure points – most prominently the complications caused by proof regarding 
causation in mass toxic tort cases together with the risk of ever-increasing bankruptcies
flowing from the volume of such litigation.
E. The Seeds of Rule Reform: the Advisory Committee Seeks to Address the 
Mass Toxic Tort Phenomenon
Perhaps because of this judicial innovation, throughout the years of controversy over the 
1966 revision of Rule 23, the Advisory Committee had declined to act. But late in 1990, 
the committee agreed to take up the question of whether Rule 23 needed revision, and, if 
so, what sorts of changes were in order.52 Predictably, the impetus for revision was the 
report of a special judicial committee on asbestos litigation, appointed by Chief Justice 
50
 Jackson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985). The case was filed as a class action but 
was not certified as one.
51 See discussion in Marcus, supra note 47 at 2015 (“These efforts relied not only on Rule 23, but also the 
power of the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to combine federal cases under 1407, most prominently 
evidenced in the 1991 order transferring all asbestos personal injury actions to Philadelphia. In re Asbestos 
Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).”).
52
 Most references cite 1991 as the beginning of the contemporary Rule 23 revision process. However, as 
Hensler notes, the minutes for the Advisory Committee’s meeting of November 30 and December 1, 1990, 
read, “It was agreed to take up Rule 23, to enlarge the opportunity for mass tort litigation, to provide for 
defendant class actions, perhaps to specify the fiduciary duties of the class representative, and to consider 
the ABA Litigation Section report.” Hensler, supra note 9 at 41, n.75.
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Rehnquist to consider strategies for managing the rising tide of asbestos litigation in the 
federal courts.53 After surveying the difficulties wrought by asbestos litigation and noting 
that “this litigation impasse cannot be broken except by aggregate or class 
proceedings,”54 the Advisory Committee recommended that Congress create “a national 
system for resolving asbestos claims which at the very least permits consolidating all 
asbestos claims in a single forum.”55 As a fallback in case this “ultimate solution” was 
not adopted, the Advisory Committee recommended that Congress expressly authorize 
class actions or collective trials in asbestos cases. Failing such measures, the Committee 
foresaw the bankruptcy of all or most available defendants.56
The volume of mass toxic tort litigation had forced the hand of the Advisory Committee.
As a basis for its deliberations, the Advisory Committee turned to a report published in 
1986 by the American Bar Association Litigation Section, which had recommended 
significant changes in the structure of Rule 23.57 The report advanced the view that the 
requirements of the 1966 rule led to “unnecessarily time consuming and expensive” 
practices.58 Believing that the tripartite structure of the rule, which required parties and 
53
 In 1991, the Judicial Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation concluded that there was a 
“litigation impasse [that] cannot be broken except by aggregate or class proceedings,” and urged Congress 
to act to resolve the problem. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Ad Hoc Commmittee on 
Asbestos Litigation 19 (1991) at 32-34.  See also Ahearn v. Fibreboard, 162 F.R.D. 505, 509 (E.D. Tex. 
1995) (“By 1990, the [asbestos litigation] situation had reached critical proportions”).
54
 Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 19 (1991) at 
32-34.
55
 Id. at 30.
56
 Id. at 27. The Report stated that: “The committee believes it to be inevitable that, unless Congress acts to 
formulate a national solution, with the present rate of dissipation of the funds of defendant producers due to 
transaction costs, large verdicts, and multiple punitive damage awards, all resources for payment of these 
claims will be exhausted in a few years.” 
57
 The ABA Litigation Section’s report was prepared in response to legislative revisions to Rule 23 
originally proposed by the Carter administration in the late 1970s. See American Bar Association Section 
of Litigation, Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements
(1986). Building on this proposal, in 1992, Judge Pointer (then chair of the committee) prepared a revision 
that did away with the three part (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) classification in Rule 23.
58
 Id. at 199.
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lawyers to decide whether their proposed class was most appropriately labeled a (b)(1), 
(b)(2), or (b)(3) action, was a major source of problems in implementing it, the section
proposed substituting a “unified standard governing all class actions.”59 Taken up by the 
Advisory Committee, the ABA Litigation Section’s proposal became the basis for an 
effort to revise the rule, directed primarily at facilitating class certification of mass toxic 
torts. In place of the tripartite structure, the proposal set forth circumstances under which 
judges could certify class actions.60 The new structure seemed likely not only to facilitate 
class certification of mass torts, but also to make certification more widely available for a 
range of other civil litigation.61
A year later, when the Advisory Committee resumed its discussion of Rule 23 revision, it 
appears that its members had become wary of changing established practices, particularly 
given what had up to that point been judicial preparedness to certify mass toxic tort 
claims in the face of an overwhelming volume of cases. The draft revision to Rule 23 was 
withdrawn on the Standing Committees’ advice that further consideration would be 
required “before such a sweeping proposal could be published for public comment.”62 In 
its minutes, the Advisory Committee noted that “[a] very common reaction is that 
lawyers have learned to live with the present rule, and do not need to devote ten years to 
59
 Id.
60 See Department Defense News, Class Action Reform Gets a Shot in the Arm, 69 Def. Couns. J. 263 
(2002). The proposal also provided for opt-in classes at the court’s discretion, and stipulated that exclusion 
from the class could be conditioned upon a prohibition against institution or maintenance of a separate 
action. Notice was made more flexible such that “sampling notice” might be permitted depending on the 
circumstances.
61
 Hensler, supra note 9 at 26 (“Taken up by the Advisory Committee, the ABA Litigation Section’s 
proposal became the basis for an effort to revise the rule, directed primarily at facilitating class certification 
of mass torts.”).
62 Department Defense News, supra note 60 at 265 (the Standing Committee also felt that “In the years 
since [the proposed 1992 revisions to Rule 23], we have engaged in that further consideration and can now 
appreciate how prescient and sophisticated that first effort was.”). Id.
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educating themselves and judges in a new rule.”63 The effect was that the courts were left 
to their improvisation, using existing procedural tools to manage the steady stream of 
mass toxic torts.
IV. “Round Two” Reforms: The Emergence of the “Futures” Mass Toxic Tort 
Class Action Blocks Major Reform Attempts
A. The Emergence of “Futures” Class Actions
As the Advisory Committee continued its deliberative process regarding the future of 
Rule 23, the mass toxic tort legal landscape evolved once again. In 1993, a new kind of 
Rule 23(b)(3) mass toxic tort class emerged - marked by the Amchem asbestos 
litigation64 - comprising individuals who had been exposed to asbestos but who had not
filed suit against any defendant. The Amchem class was certified at the time of 
settlement, rather than earlier in the litigation process, and the terms of the settlement 
meant that future asbestos claimants would be precluded from suing the defendants 
except under certain restrictive conditions. In return, plaintiffs would have access to 
compensation through administrative facilities. The structure of the settlement carved out 
of the class all “inventory” clients of plaintiffs’ attorney (for whom lawsuits had already 
been filed).
63 Hensler, supra note 9 at 26, citing Minutes of Oct. 21–23, 1993 meeting. With a new Chair, Judge Patrick 
Higginbotham, and several other new members, the committee decided that further deliberation was 
necessary before formally proposing revisions to the rule. The committee then began the protracted inquiry 
into class action practice in which it is still engaged. Id.
64 Judge Robert Parker appointed a plaintiffs’ steering committee to organize the futures class in 1993, and 
approved the settlement in 1995. Ahearn v. Fibreboard, 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
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The “futures” class created difficulties in the mass toxic tort context. Future claimants 
comprised an “amorphous group” with varying levels of toxic exposure.65 Class members 
would likely be unaware of their legal status, their “ignorance” stemming from the long 
latency periods of many toxic substances within the human body such that the victim’s 
first awareness of exposure often coincided with the onset of the disease.66 This 
characteristic of toxic diseases created several problematic legal issues for future 
claimants, including whether such claimants could ever effectively participate in the 
judicial process.67 In addition, even if future claimants affirmatively opted-out of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action, the opt-out plaintiffs then faced the difficult task of litigating 
independently without the necessary resources to successfully challenge the defendant 
company.
Although some viewed futures settlements as examples of judges and lawyers rising to 
the procedural challenges posed by mass torts, the cases were soon embroiled in 
controversy.68 Critics charged that binding future claimants - who arguably were not even 
aware at the time of notice that they might some day have a legal claim - to the terms of 
the settlement would be a violation of due process. Ethicists argued that the plaintiff 
attorneys who negotiated the settlements had discounted the value of the claims of future
65 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1996).
66
 Id. at 633 (noting that the onset of mesothelioma in asbestos-exposed victims, for example, may occur 
many years after even the most casual contact with the toxin). 
67 See Daniel M. Weddle, Settlement Class Actions and “Mere Exposure” Future Claimants: Problems in 
Mass Toxic Tort Liability, 47 Drake L. Rev. 113, (noting that “futures” class members have no manifest 
injury at the time the class action is filed, which creates a two-fold problem: the exposure-only member has 
no way of knowing whether he or she will ever need any of the benefits of a settlement plan or whether his 
or her particular injuries will be covered by such a settlement; additionally, the exposure-only member has 
no way of making an informed decision to opt-out of the class action because the settlement, barring 
coverage of all potential direct and indirect injuries, may or may not cover the types of injuries incurred in 
the future but latent at the time of the litigation.).
68
 See Hensler, supra note 9 at 26 (“Critics charged that binding future claimants – who arguably were not 
even aware at the time of notice that they might some day have a legal claim - to the terms of the settlement 
would be a violation of due process.”).
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asbestos litigants in return for more generous payments to current asbestos litigants, 
whom these attorneys also represented. That the classes were certified at the time of 
settlement heightened concerns about possible collusion between the plaintiff attorneys 
and defendants, because it suggested to some that the defendants had agreed to the 
certifications only because they had been able to find plaintiff attorneys who were willing 
to negotiate attractive deals with them.69
B. The Advisory Committee’s Response to the “Futures” Class
In the growing shadow of the future claimant class action, from 1994 the Advisory 
Committee continued to debate Rule 23 revision.70 Importantly, the mood of the Advisory 
Committee and those it invited to join in its deliberations had shifted away from an 
enthusiasm to facilitate mass tort class actions - hitherto by virtue of judicial innovation -
toward an interest in curbing perceived “class action abuses” exemplified by questionable 
aspects of the futures class settlement.71 In the context of this perception of abuse, not 
only did the earlier Advisory Committee proposal to substitute a unitary standard for the
69
 See, for example, Susan Koniak, “Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, 
Inc.” 90 Cornell Law Review 1045 (1995). The conflicting views of legal ethicists who testified as experts 
in the Georgine case are summarized in Judge Reed’s Memorandum Opinion, Georgine v. Amchem 
Products, No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 16, 1994). These problems were accentuated in subsequent 
mass toxic tort settlements. The court in Asbestos Litigation v. Ahearn permitted a class action settlement 
with future claimants who had no possibility of opting out. As noted in Judge Smith’s dissent, the 
settlement “force[d] asbestos victims to surrender their claims in exchange for a meager $10 million of 
Fibreboard’s $225-250 million net worth.” Without knowing the full extent of their asbestos-related 
injuries, the exposure-only group was forced to join the settlement-only class. Asbestos Litig. v. Ahearn, 90 
F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996) vacated & remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997). 
The case was subsequently heard on remand by the Fifth Circuit. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (5th 
Cir. 1998) cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
70
 The Advisory Committee invited leading practitioners to address its members (1 Working Papers of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 266 (1997) (hereafter “Working 
Papers of the Advisory Committee”).
71
 The minutes of the April 1994 meeting summarizes comments by one member as follows: “Subsequent 
history [after 1966] has been a story of expansion and excesses … The fear that defendants would rig 
plaintiffs classes has not materialized. They have not had to. The ‘take-a-dive’ class has been arranged by 
plaintiff attorneys who settle out class claims for liberal fee recovery … Abuses of Rule 23 are rising.” Id. 
at 187, 189 per John Frank (a member of the 1966 Advisory Committee).
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(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) categories looked less attractive, but indeed the desire to 
facilitate mass personal injury class actions was diminished if not temporarily 
extinguished. Although never incorporated in a formal proposal, consideration was 
briefly given to the possibility of an entirely separate rule to deal with mass toxic torts 
(incorporating a solution to the “futures” problem) but Rule Enabling Act concerns 
emerged and the proposal was deferred.72 Some even questioned whether any revision to 
Rule 23 was appropriate at that time.73 It is therefore not surprising that when reforms to 
Rule 23 were finally considered by the Advisory Committee in 1995, changes were 
advanced that would have significantly restricted the ability to successfully prosecute a 
mass toxic tort class action. 
1. “Necessity” and “Probable Success”
The changes included adding a requirement that certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class be 
“necessary” (instead of only “superior”) for fair and efficient adjudication of the case -
adding a requirement that in certifying Rule 23(b)(3) classes, judges consider both the 
“probable success” of the case if it went forward as a class action and the “significance” 
of this success.74 A necessity standard for certification would certainly have been more 
72 Id. at 206 (“A topic that recurred repeatedly throughout the day [was] whether problems of mass tort 
actions are so distinctive that a separate rule should be developed. One advantage might be to address the 
problem of ‘futures’ claimants that seem to be unique to this setting … Doubts were raised in response. A 
specific mass torts rule may seem so laden with substantive overtones as to raise legitimate doubts about 
the wisdom of invoking regular rulemaking procedures.”).
73 Id at 214 (“Whether Rule 23 changes are needed at all remains uncertain. The mass tort phenomenon 
seems to be driving the process. If that is so, it must be asked whether asbestos and breast implant litigation 
are an isolated phenomenon - and, perhaps, when more is known, may be quite different from each other … 
is all of this discussion an attempt to design a system for asbestos? And isn’t that foolish, in part because 
too late?”).
74
 Edward H. Cooper, Federal Class Action Reform in the United States: Past and Future and Where Next, 
69 Def. Couns. J. 432, 433 (2002) (“Defendants expressed two major concerns - that even a preliminary 
consideration of the merits would inevitably lead to complete discovery on the merits before a certification 
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difficult to meet than the original superiority standard, and considering the likely success 
and significance of a proposed class action would require trial judges to determine, in a 
preliminary way, the merits of the underlying allegations. The proposal was rejected 
because of a major concern that even a preliminary consideration of “probable success”
would inevitably lead to complete discovery on the merits before a certification decision 
could be made, and that a certification based on a prediction that the plaintiffs have a 
good chance of winning would exert irresistible pressure on defendant’s to settle.75
2. Maturity
There was substantial - although far from unanimous - support for the view that a mass 
toxic tort class action should not be certified to resolve a claim that rests on uncertain or
still-developing scientific evidence. It was urged that in mass toxic tort litigation there is 
frequently a race to file the first class claim, often hard on the heels of preliminary 
announcements of a new theory of injury or causation, or new evidence of exposure.76
Challenges to the “maturity” proposal took several directions, but a familiar fear arose 
that a proposal responding to problems with mass toxic tort litigation would likely disrupt 
settled areas of practice. It was argued, for example, that considerations of maturity were 
irrelevant to a securities law violation class action – such violations could be corrected by 
a single class action without awaiting the results of individual actions challenging the 
decision could be made, and that a certification based on a prediction that the plaintiffs have a good chance 
of winning would exert irresistible pressure to settle.”).
75 Id.
76 Cooper, supra note 23 at 955 (“The race is prompted by the desire to become class counsel, or at least a 
member of a steering committee. With little experience of the outcome of individual actions, there is a great 
pressure to settle and little guidance as to appropriate terms. Time and experience with individual litigation 
are needed. Only time will enable real science, developed by agencies independent of the litigation, to 
displace ‘junk science.’ This science will bolster the claims, sort out the good from the bad, or refute them 
all. Experience facilitates realistic settlement.”).
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same violation.77 In another familiar vein, it was noted that there is was no proposed 
definition of maturity - the lack of definition threatened to confuse established practice, 
particularly in cases other than mass toxic tort litigation, and might provide yet another 
excuse for the denial of class certification in otherwise appropriate circumstances.78
3. Concerns Over Class Action Volume
Additional areas of controversy were identified. Primary was a concern was that too 
many larger personal injury claims were being aggregated in mass toxic tort class actions. 
To remedy this, the Advisory Committee proposed revising the list of matters pertinent to 
determining whether certification was appropriate to include factors with an obvious 
bearing on mass toxic tort claims: the practical ability of individual class members to 
pursue their claims without class certification and class members’ interests in maintaining 
or defending separate actions.79
The public comments and testimony on the proposed factors demonstrate the difficulty of 
ensuring that modest changes do not run out of control. Ironically – given that the 
proposals were designed to curb mass tort volume - much of the criticism of the 
proposals emphasized their likely deleterious effect on such claims. The courts, it was 
argued, should not be expressly instructed to consider individual interests, because 
77 Id. at 965.
78 Id.
79 Id at 952 (“One formulation would add four words: ‘the practical ability of individual class members to 
pursue their claims or otherwise obtain relief without class certification.’”).
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claimants with large individual claims are also those for whom the opportunity to opt out 
is most meaningful.80
Taken as a whole, the comments in relation to the “necessity”, “maturity” and “volume” 
concerns raised above are an embodiment of the difficulties associated with drafting 
general provisions that will adapt Rule 23 to mass toxic litigation without also inviting 
unintended consequences in better-settled areas of class-action practice. Considering the
divergent criticisms of the rule reform proposals, the Advisory Committee concluded that 
the changes should be rejected. The risk of unintended consequences outweighed the 
modest benefits that were sought and the proposals otherwise failed to meet squarely the 
major challenges proposed by the “futures” settlement class in cases such as Amchem .81
4. “Settlement-Only” Classes
Another change, proposed to respond to the identified uncertainty about the application 
of Rule 23 to the Amchem-style “settlement-only” class added a new certification 
category - (b)(4) - that explicitly mentioned settlement classes and provided authority for
judges to certify such classes in response to the parties’ joint request.82 Certification of 
settlement classes had become exceptionally controversial and the profession sought to 
settle the issue through rule revision, notwithstanding that “futures” settlements had been 
80
 The importance of large claimants was stressed from another perspective as well: exclusion of large 
claimants from the class definition makes it more difficult to achieve settlement - a phenomenon that may 
be attributed to the bargaining power of their claims, or that instead may be attributed to the defendant’s 
desire to achieve “global peace”. Other comments, focusing ostensibly on mass toxic torts and drawing 
from the asbestos (and heart-valve) experiences, urged that even if every class member is able to pursue 
individual litigation, class litigation can achieve remedies that are not available in individual actions –
specifically such remedies as funding for research that would benefit the class. Id at 933.
81 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
82
 See Cooper, supra note 23 at 934 (“The 1996 proposals included a very restrained 23(b)(4) provision that 
would allow certification of a (b)(3) class for settlement, even though the same class might not be certified 
for trial. This proposal provoked extensive and illuminating commentary.”).
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fingered as a central source of toxic tort abuse. A comprehensive critique of asbestos 
futures settlement classes was spearheaded by Professor Susan Koniak,83 but the debate 
was somewhat short-lived. In the year prior to the proposal, the United States Supreme 
Court had taken up the question of the legality of settlement-only classes and had not yet 
handed down its decision. It was apparent to the Advisory Committee that they could not 
act on the proposal before hearing from the court. Indeed, as a lack of consensus on the 
overwhelming majority of the 1996 proposals became apparent, the pending Supreme 
Court decision developed into a rationale for postponing action on the proposed revisions 
to Rule 23.84 In October 1997, the Advisory Committee agreed to table Rule 23 revision.
5. 1996 Proposal Jettisoned by the Advisory Committee
The Supreme Court’s decision striking down the proposed Amchem settlement
heightened perception of sharp controversy over the very purposes of Rule 23(b)(3) and 
dampened much of the Advisory Committee’s momentum its long effort to reform the 
rule. Importantly, the issue that had triggered the long process of reviewing Rule 23(b)(3)
- the need to find some means of handling mass toxic torts - remained unanswered. This 
was recognized by the Advisory Committee, which proposed that the Judicial Conference
83
 Koniak, supra note 69. Settlement-only classes were opposed because they were believed to be highly 
susceptible to conflicts of interest between plaintiff attorneys and class members, and to collusion between 
defendants and plaintiff attorneys. See also comments by Howard Metzenbaum, Chair, Consumer 
Federation of America at 2 Working Papers of the Advisory Committee, supra note 70, at 91 (“There have 
been too many settlements made where the attorneys took far too much of the proceeds, and the aggrieved 
consumers received but a pittance . . . We urge the committee [to withdraw the settlement class provision 
and engage in] further study of how collusive settlement can be avoided and how the interests of absentee 
class members can be adequately represented.”).
84 See Hensler, supra note 9 at 36 (“After two days of meetings, the committee had approved only two 
revisions: a provision for interlocutory appeal, and a small change in the wording of Rule 23(c)(1) 
indicating that the judge may certify a class ‘when practicable’ (instead of ‘as soon as practicable’) in the 
course of litigation. The following month, the Standing Committee voted to recommend the interlocutory 
appeal provision to the Judicial Conference, but postponed the ‘when practicable’ recommendation.”).
29
appoint a special committee to develop recommendations for improving the management 
of mass personal injury litigation.85
The Rule 23 debate had significantly changed since it was first waged in the 1980s - mass 
toxic tort class actions, in particularly those presenting a futures settlement problem, were 
now playing a role that would have been inconceivable during Round One, when the 
Advisory Committee’s note warning against certification of such personal injury suits 
still held sway. Having shaped the application of Rule 23 for almost 30 years, mass toxic 
torts were now exerting their influence on proposals to change the substance of the rule. 
But Rule 23 had once again survived, notwithstanding a very rigorous second round of 
proposed amendments. Fears that amendments to Rule 23 to accommodate mass toxic 
tort litigation would ultimately implicate changes in general class action practice were 
acute, and indeed aggravated, by a perception that even the fairly robust changes before 
the Advisory Committee in 1996 would not address the core of the mass toxic tort 
problem. The emergence of futures settlements had only clarified the legal and ethical 
problems presented by mass toxic torts, and rule reform was now a blunt instrument with 
which to perform a delicate but important operation.
85
 The special committee - a working group on mass torts - completed its work and issued its report and 
recommendations in early 1999. The working group and Advisory Committee recommended that the Chief 
Justice appoint a new Ad Hoc Committee on Mass Torts, charged with recommending legislation, rule 
revision, changes in case management and practice, and judicial education. In a preface to the Advisory 
Committee’s and Working Group on Mass Torts’ report to the Chief Justice and Judicial Conference, 
issued in February 1999, the Advisory Committee Chair Judge Paul Niemeyer wrote: “In August 1996, the 
Committee published proposed changes to Rule 23. The public hearings and comments persuaded the 
Committee that the proposals would not solve the most serious of the identified problems and might raise 
troubling collateral issues. It also became apparent that rulemaking might not be adequate to solve some of 
the more serious problems. During this same period, Congress … began to conduct its own hearings. This 
activity increased to the point that the House was prepared to pass a bill to address some of the perceived 
problems before time ran out. Many believe that some final action may be taken by the current Congress.” 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Report of the AdvisoryCommittee on Civil Rules and the 
Working Group on Mass Torts to the Chief Justice of the United States and to the Judicial Conference of 
the United States (Feb. 15, 1999).
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V. “Round Three” Reforms: Current Proposals Diluted by Mass Toxic Tort 
Concerns
A. Empirical Foundations of the C urrent Proposals
Despite the tabling of the 1996 amendments, the seeds of rule reform had been firmly 
planted into the class action landscape.86 Several studies were commissioned to determine 
the merit of a variety of reforms to Rule 23 – most of them focusing in part or in whole 
on the range of problems presented by the now steady stream of mass toxic tort 
litigation.87 Among them, a Rand study, in line with a great amount of less rigorously 
assembled empirical information, emphasized the importance of class counsel, including 
fee practices, and of judicial review of class action settlements. These were areas of 
concern dating back to the first appearance of toxic tort futures settlements in the early 
1990s - concerns which had not been adequately addressed by the 1996 proposed 
amendments to Rule 23. The commissioned studies, together with a report of the ad hoc 
working group investigating mass torts generally, provided additional information about 
the operation of Rule 23 in the context of mass toxic torts and illuminated many of the 
86
 The Advisory Committee’s continuing deliberations not only had at their disposal the comments from the 
hearings on the proposed 1996 amendments, but also the benefit of the Rand Institute for Civil Justice’s 
case study of ten class actions, eventually published in 2000 as “Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public 
Goals for Private Gain”. See Hensler, supra note 9. 
87
 In addition to the Rand study, the Federal Judicial Center did a study of class actions in four high-activity 
courts and is carrying out another study presently. See the discussion of the materials before the Advisory 
Committee in Susan Ford Bedor, Proposed Changes to FRCP 23 – Class Action Rules Undergoing Change, 
49-MAY Fed. Law. 49 (2002).
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problems that had emerges over the preceding years, including new problems associated 
with multiple, overlapping class actions.88
Presently, after what is now more than 10 years of work, proposed amendments to Rule 
23 have been submitted by the Supreme Court of the United States to Congress for 
consideration.89 Absent Congressional intervention, the amendments to Rule 23 will take 
effect on December 1, 2003. The proposed changes do not address the criteria for 
granting or denying class certification but rather refine the process for managing a class 
action once it has been certified. The current proposals focus on four areas: the timing of 
the court’s certification decision and related notice; increased judicial scrutiny and review 
of settlements; judicial appointment and evaluation of class counsel; and compensation to 
class counsel. Arguably, many of the current proposals reflect contemporary class action 
88 Along with the currently proposed amendments to Rule 23 outlined below, the Advisory Committee 
released a companion report on unfinished business recommending that the Judicial Conference support 
legislation designed to minimize the number of “overlapping” class actions in state and federal courts. Such 
legislation emerged in the form of HR 2341, bipartisan legislation introduced on June 27, 2001 in the 
House of Representatives by Hon. Bob Goodlatte, R-Va. and others. The legislation amends Section 1332 
(“Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs”) of 28 U.S.C. in a number of important ways.  For 
instance, the amended provision creates original jurisdiction in the district courts for any civil action in 
which the controversy exceeds $2,000,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) and any member of a plaintiff 
class is a citizen of a different state than any defendant. Effectively, the legislation expands the jurisdiction 
of federal courts, allowing them to more easily hear large class action lawsuits in which plaintiffs and 
defendants are from different states. The attempt is to ensure that national class action lawsuits, involving 
plaintiffs from around the country, can be heard in federal courts. See description of the general operation 
of the legislation provided by the U.S. Chamber Institute, Litigation Fairness Campaign at 
http://www.litigationfairness.org/act.html (last visited May 5, 2003). On April 11, 2003, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s voted embrace the legislation which, according the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is 
designed to “curb rampant venue shopping in state courts and abusive settlements in which class members 
receive coupons or something else of little value while their lawyers receive huge legal fees.” See U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, Newsletter, April 11, 2003 at 
http://www.litigationfairness.org/pdf/041103_release.pdf (last visited May 5, 2003).
89 A copy of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives can be found at  
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv03p.pdf (last visited May 5, 2002), while a 
complete copy of the amendments and explanatory committee notes submitted to Congress can be found at 
the Federal Judiciary website at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/. The proposed modifications include 
several recommended by the Advisory Committee to the proposed changes published in August 2001. After 
those proposals were published, the Advisory Committee received voluminous testimony and comments in 
support of or in opposition to the proposals. The rule changes submitted to the Judicial Conference and 
ultimately the Supreme Court and Congress now reflect the Advisory Committee’s consideration of those 
comments.
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practice; however, other proposals - such as those relating to settlement overview and a 
second opt-out opportunity - are relatively new to the class action arena.90
B. Timing of the Certification Decision
The current language of Rule 23(c)(1)(A) states that a certification decision must be 
made “as soon as practicable” after the commencement of the action, thus requiring that a 
motion for certification to be brought with reasonable speed after the filing of the case. 
The Advisory Committee heard testimony that this requirement may create a tension 
between the need for a swift decision on certification and the practicalities of gathering 
the proof needed for the court to evaluate a class certification motion.91 The proposals 
will amend that language to “at an early practicable time”.92 The premise of the proposal 
is that it is proper to take the time needed to uncover the substance of the dispute, “but 
not to indulge discovery on the merits or decision on the merits”.93 The proposed note 
suggests that time also may be needed for the parties to conduct discovery to support the 
certification decision and acknowledges that, as a part of its certification decision, the 
court is not required to evaluate the case on the merits. It goes on to say, however, that 
90 See Bedor, supra note 87 at 50 (“The current proposed changes are broader in scope than the 1998 
change, and they focus on four areas: the timing of the court’s certification decision and related notice; 
increased judicial scrutiny and review of settlements; judicial appointment and evaluation of class counsel; 
and compensation to class counsel. … Many of the proposals do reflect current practice; however, other 
proposals are relatively new to the class action procedure.”).
91
 Typically, this entails discovery regarding the Rule 23 class elements, such as the size or extent of the 
class, commonality of issues and facts among the class members, evaluation of the circumstances and 
adequacy of the class representatives, and the need for certification.
92
 Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 20, 2002, 96 (Revised to account for action taken by 
Standing Committee at its June 10-11 meeting, hereafter, “AC Report”), a complete reprint of which 
appears at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/CVRulesJC.pdf. See also Bedor, supra note 87 at 50, 
noting that the proposed language is arguably consistent with current practice, which has shown that 
certification decisions are not always reached soon after the commencement of the action. The study 
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center showed many “seemingly tardy certification decisions.”
93
 AC Report, supra note 92 at 133 (“The premise of the proposal is that it is proper to take the time needed 
to uncover the substance of the dispute, ‘but not to indulge discovery on the merits or decision on the 
merits.’”).
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discovery in aid of the certification decision often includes information required to 
identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at trial.94
Arguably, the proposal presents a risk of unintended consequences. The change to “at an 
early practical time” may provide an opportunity for additional pre-certification 
discovery that may therefore delay the certification decision. Concerns were raised before 
the Advisory Committee that defendants would use the new language to convince courts 
to entertain intrusive discovery, making plaintiffs more desperate to settle the litigation.
The danger is that discovery will be so extensive that the merits of the case are litigated 
prior to a certification decision.95
In mass toxic tort litigation, even though causation is predominantly at issue during the 
actual trial, the analysis begins much sooner, during the class action certification 
proceeding. Before the court can even consider whether a toxic substance injured the 
members of the class, it must first determine whether the plaintiffs have standing to sue, 
whether the class has questions of fact and law in common, and whether a joinder of their 
claims is practicable.96 By softening the mandate for quick certification and 
acknowledging the possibility of more extensive discovery, the proposed delay invites 
litigants and judges to consider the merits of the class action. This, in turn, may permit 
94
 Id. at 98 (“In this sense it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the ‘merits,’ limited to those 
aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed basis.”).
95
 Id. at 135 per Mary Alexander, Esq., S-F Testimony pp 58 ff: For ATLA (“The change to at an early 
practical time ‘will provide an opportunity for extensive precertification discovery and litigation that could 
be used to delay crucial certification.’ Although the change seems modest, we are concerned that it will 
make the situation ‘even worse,’ that defendants will use the new language to convince courts to do further 
discovery and make plaintiffs more desperate to settle.”).
96
 In other words, although a plaintiff will not have to prove each causation requirement comprehensively 
to be certified as a class member, he must at least demonstrate that he is one of many who will be allowed 
to participate in a lawsuit against the defendant. In order to be considered a member of a toxic tort class 
action under Rule 23, each plaintiff has to first demonstrate that the toxic substance in question might have 
caused his particular injury.
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opposing counsel greater opportunity to discredit the expert’s testimony on behalf of the 
class in order to eliminate a representative from the class or rule out a class action 
altogether. Defendant’s counsel may also benefit from greater opportunities to scrutinize 
the class expert’s theory of exposure and to assert that other existing factors could have 
affected the distribution of the toxic substance within members of the class. Counsel may
also have the opportunity to discredit the validity of laboratory experiments on animals 
for the purpose of proving the potential harm of toxic substances on humans, as well as 
the admissibility of and weight given to epidemiological studies.
The upshot of the proposals may be a greater level of scrutiny of the plaintiffs’ scientific 
evidence of causation at the certification stage. That possibility is made more apparent by 
persistent suggestions that a Daubert-like inquiry into the admissibility of scientific 
evidence should be allowed at the class action certification stage.97 Certainly, that may be 
a position that the Advisory Committee - and even a portion of the profession - may wish 
to tolerate, or even encourage. But it is nevertheless an unintended outcome, and one that 
deserves closer scrutiny in the context of the problems sought to be addressed by the 
proposed change to the requirements for certification timing.
97 Williams, supra note 29 at 201 (“A Daubert-like inquiry into the admissibility of scientific evidence is 
vital and should be allowed in class action certifications. Such an inquiry plays a substantial role in 
determining whether a class action will consist of twenty or two thousand class members. Daubert factors 
should be used by opposing counsel to challenge, and possibly discredit, any expert scientific evidence 
offered to prove that a plaintiff should be part of a class and that the class meets the requirements of Rule 
23. Counsel should be able to examine a theory’s reliability and relevancy, as well as point out its 
deficiencies, while addressing each of the four (or, in Texas, six) non- exclusive factors set forth by 
Daubert.”).
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C. Increase judicial oversight of settlements
Judicial involvement in class action settlements – traditionally an area of significant 
controversy – has been the focus of addition scrutiny in the mass toxic tort context, 
particularly as potential defendants increasingly embrace the economic incentives 
associated with quick settlements and global peace. Proponents of increased judicial 
scrutiny over mass toxic tort settlements point to the unique legal and ethical problems 
presented by the compromise of hundreds and thousands of claims arising from alleged 
toxic exposure. The active, behind-the- scenes role of some judges in “encouraging”
settlement - itself a source of considerable debate - was a characteristic of the Agent 
Orange litigation.98 In cases such as the Amchem litigation, in which the proposed 
settlement is filed on the same day as the class action, the judge participates (at least 
publicly) only when formal motions are made to certify the class and approve class 
settlement. In this situation, current Rule 23(e) provides little guidance to assist the court 
with its review of the settlements.99 As others have persuasively argued,100 many of the 
current problems with settlement of mass torts are related to the generality of Rule 23.
98
 See Peter Schuck , Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts (1986) at 259-60, 295-96 
(discussing the powerful role of Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange case).
99
 Rule 23(e) provides: “A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in 
such manner as the court directs.” Rule 23(e). Rule 23(e) contains no settlement “standards”, while other 
provisions of Rule 23 provide only vague criteria - a “fair” and “reasonable” settlement negotiated by class 
counsel capable of providing “adequate representation” to the entire class, including any absent members.
100
 See Roger C. Crampton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An 
Introduction, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 811, 823 (“As Judge Schwarzer argues in his afterword, many current 
problems are related to the generality of these standards. Judicial scrutiny of class action settlements, 
unarguable influenced by judicial approbation of the docket-paring results of settlement, suffers from the 
absence of a prescribed procedure or detailed standards for considering fairness to absent claimants and 
adequacy of representation.”).
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Under the proposed amendments, Rule 23(e) is completely rewritten to emphasize the 
court’s responsibilities to review a proposed settlement.
1. Regulating Side Deals
Rule 23 (e)(2) is entirely new. It directs the parties to identify any agreement made “in 
connection with a proposed settlement”.101 The determination of whether an agreement is 
made “in connection” with a settlement is not defined, but the intention of the proposal is 
to notify judges of any side agreements that the attorneys for the parties have made that 
they may not wish to include in the settlement agreement itself. The Advisory Committee 
said that the provision would help the court determine whether a proposed settlement 
agreement was fair and adequate.102
This proposal is an obvious response to mass toxic tort futures settlements which - as was 
the case of Amchem - fail to include within the class individuals who had already filed 
suit. The proposal is also designed to permit the court to determine the existence of “take-
out agreements”, which are increasingly a feature of mass toxic tort settlements, pursuant 
to which defendants seek an agreement with plaintiff's counsel not to represent 
individuals in subsequent related lawsuits against the defendant.103
101
 Proposed Rule 23(e)(2) provides: “The parties seeking approval of a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise under Rule 23(e)(1) must file a statement identifying any agreement made in connection with 
the proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise.” AC Report, supra note 92 at 254.
102 Bedor, supra note 87 at 54 (“This requirement is aimed at making sure that the court is able to evaluate 
all aspects of the settlement, including separate agreements that may exist outside of the class settlement 
agreement. Obviously, the rule is concerned with making sure that a settlement reflects negotiations 
regarding the benefits to the class and that class interests have not been compromised by giving benefits to 
other individuals or cases at the expense of the class.”).
103 See Kearfott, supra note 9 at 167 (“Another potential ethical constraint - for plaintiffs’ and defense 
counsel alike - arises in connection with the settlement of a plaintiff's claim, where a defendant seeks an 
arrangement with plaintiff's counsel under which he or she agrees not to represent individuals in subsequent 
related lawsuits against the defendant.”).
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Despite the merit of the proposal, there are a number of potentially important areas not 
addressed by the suggested amendments. Many of these areas were discussed before the 
Advisory Committee and will not be extensively reproduced in this paper. The primary 
concerns are, first, that while side agreements are required to be identified, there is no 
requirement that the settling parties disclose material facts about the settlement 
negotiation, the settlement itself or the relationships among class counsel and the parties.
The absence of such an additional requirement may contribute to the amendments failing 
to meet their intended purpose, that is, the identification of incentives to settle not 
obvious to the court at the time of class certification. Second, there are also no provisions 
dealing with the sanctions for failure to comply with the disclose requirements.104 There 
is also a potential clarity problem with the words “in connection with the settlement”. If it 
is the intention of the amendments to “get on the table directly related undertakings”, 
clearer words may be required - in the mass toxic tort context, for example, a defendant 
may be engaged in simultaneous negotiations with named plaintiffs in private class 
actions, with federal regulators, and with state attorneys general. The proposals do not 
offer guidance as to whether all of these arrangements be disclosed.105
104
 AC Report, supra note 92 at 179 per David J. Piell, Student, 01-CV-094 (“This is a welcome addition, 
but does not go far enough. What is the sanction for failure to disclose? Can the judgment be reopened? 
Can class members who opted out because the settlement was inadequate choose to come back in when an 
enhanced settlement results? Guidance should be provided, including a statement whether it is proper to 
deny any sanction if the failure to disclose resulted from a good-faith belief that the agreement was not ‘in 
connection with’ the settlement.”).
105
 See also comments before the Advisory Committee by Brian Wolfman, Esq., D.C. Hearing 120-122, 
126-129 noting that there is also a compelling argument that side-agreement disclosure should be 
mandatory - based on the experience of those representing objectors in mass toxic tort settlements, there are 
often difficulties in determining which particular settlements within a settlement scheme may be masking 
relevant side agreements unless those agreements are disclosed by the parties. So it was only after the 
Amchem settlement was rejected that the settling parties disclosed that defendants had agreed to pay “what 
turned out to be millions of dollars of class counsel’s costs in litigating the fairness of the settlement, even 
in the event that the settlement was not approved.” 
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2. Second Opt-Out Opportunity
Rule 23(e)(3) also is entirely new and represents a significant innovation in class action 
practice. It authorizes a court to refuse to approve settlement of a Rule 23(b)(3) class 
action unless the settlement affords class members a second opportunity to request 
exclusion after a settlement is proposed, even though an initial opportunity to request 
exclusion has expired.106 The purpose is to permit exclusion at a time when class 
members have clear information on the consequences of remaining in the class and a real 
incentive to think about the matter. There is also an “adequacy of representation” purpose 
– class members cannot be expected to monitor the work of class lawyers, and lawyers’ 
interests are not naturally aligned with class-member interests. Expanded opt-out rights 
may enhance members’ abilities to monitor their lawyers’ work.107
The time of the opt-out may be important for victims of toxic torts and, certainly, there 
may be merit in providing those exposed to toxic substances with a second opt-out at a 
time when the aggregate settlement terms are known – particularly where this is 
sometime after filing. However, the proposal will not address the circumstances of many 
toxic tort victims where the toxin-related injury may be latent for many years. The latent 
106
 Proposed Rule 23(e)(3) provides “In an action previously certified as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to 
individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so.” AC 
Report, supra note 92 at 102.
107
 In addition, the prospect of opt outs may encourage the parties to negotiate a settlement more favorable 
to class members. Of course, there are alternative views on the due-process effects of the proposal, see for 
example, AC Report, supra note 92 at 193 per Bruce Alexander, Esq., D.C. Hearing 310 ff. and Written 
Statement, 01-CV-041: “A second opt out ‘breeds laziness and free rider issues.’ It encourages class 
counsel to communicate even less with class members. The unintended effect will be even less interest by 
the litigants in the litigation. Class members who do not opt out at the first opportunity can protect their 
interests by objecting to the settlement.”
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injury, should it arise, functions as a notice to the victim of his or her membership in the 
class, as well as an indication of the seriousness of disease. If the latency period is 
significant, it may well extend beyond any second-opt out opportunity afforded at the 
time settlement terms are know. Accordingly, even in the face of the proposed 
amendments, exposure-only claimants will not necessarily be permitted to exit the class 
at the time that they become aware of their injuries. Of course, while it might be possible 
to defer the second opt-out decision until a time when an individual class member knows 
what he or she will receive under the settlement, it would arguably destroy most mass-
tort settlements if latent-injury class members were allowed to decide to opt-out, say, 21
years after settlement when their injury becomes manifest.108
There is some prospect that competing counsel will mount concerted campaigns to solicit 
exclusions, should a second opt-out opportunity be afforded, but it is difficult to predict 
how often that will happen or what the consequences might be.109 Giving class members 
a second opportunity to opt out may also encourage objections and make it more difficult 
for defendants to gauge the likelihood of further litigation. However, the Advisory 
Committee heard these kinds of argument and nevertheless concluded that the second 
opt-out opportunity would provide judges with a way to obtain additional information 
before deciding whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate.
108 AC Report, supra note 92 at 189 (“Asbestos should not be used as an example for all cases. In many 
cases where ‘the biological clock ticks faster’ it will take two years, or four, to identify all ‘downstream 
claims’. Defendants can deal with this kind of ‘extended global peace.’ The back-end opt out can be 
worked out. In a large heterogeneous mass tort, the back-end opt out ‘can address the constitutional needs.’ 
But if the class is more cohesive, settlement without a back-end opt out may be appropriate. It would be a 
mistake to require a back-end opt out in all mass torts; if the disease affects a finite population and its 
progression is known, back-end opt out may not be needed.”)
109
 AC Report, supra note 92 at 193 per Walter J. Andrews, Esq., D.C. Hearing 284-286 (“The possibility 
of opt-outs makes settlement more difficult. Plaintiffs should not have a second opportunity to opt out: this 
allows them to litigate once, and then a second time if not satisfied with the class-action resolution. This 
will have a particularly adverse impact on insurers by ‘introduc[ing] an expensive level of volatility and 
unpredictability into the establishment of reserves’ for class actions.”).
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3. Absence of Settlement Guidance
The amendments offer no direction about whether to certify a settlement class – an area 
of significant concern to the Advisory Committee since 1996. The notes as first published 
did contain several criteria to assist the court in evaluating a proposed settlement, but 
these caused significant concerns, including anticipated difficulties with interpretation.110
Accordingly, as submitted to the Supreme Court and Congress, the proposed changes 
provide not even a suggestion of some of the more obvious questions that might be asked 
by a judge prior to settlement approval, including, for example: what similar cases settle 
for absent class treatment; whether a class member might recover more from individual 
litigation; what percentage of the class have opted-out of the settlement; and how much 
effort is required to participate in the settlement? Accordingly, while the proposed 
amendments to Rule 23(e) responds to some of the concerns expressed in Amchem,111
they provide little guidance as to when it is appropriate for a court to certify a settlement-
only class. This must be considered a major deficiency in the capacity of the amendment
to deal with attempts to settle mass toxic tort litigation, particularly those involving 
exposure-only claimants.
110 Comments in response to the proposed criteria were critical and focused on the difficulty in achieving 
truly impartial court review of proposed class action settlements. See AC Report, supra note 92 at 174 per 
David J. Piell, Student, 01-CV-094 “The court will find it difficult to be impartial with respect to [the 
settlement class criteria] - for example, it has an interest in avoiding lengthy trial proceedings. The cost of 
trial is not an appropriate consideration where there will be fee shifting. The extent of participation in 
settlement negotiations by court or a court-appointed officer is also a problem: if the judge is involved, 
objective review is unlikely; even if it is a court-appointed officer, the judge is under pressure to accept the 
officer’s recommendation. Factor (G) calls for findings similar to those required by Ortiz to approve a 
limited-fund class — that is a lot of work for something that is only one factor.”)
111
 For example, the side-agreement provisions in proposed 23(e)(2), supra note 101.
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D. Judicial Appointment and Evaluation of Attorneys
Rule 23(g) is entirely new. It confirms the court’s responsibility to appoint class counsel, 
separating this function from its present place as part of the Rule 23(a)(4) assurance that 
the class representative will represent class interests “fairly and adequately”.112 The 
criteria for appointment have been drafted to ease the way for the appointment of good 
lawyers with little or no class action experience, and provision is made for the court to 
designate interim counsel (prior to certification) to act on behalf of a proposed class.113
The new section requires the court to also consider the work that an applicant for class 
counsel has done in identifying and investigating potential claims in the specific class 
action. This requirement is intended to respond to long-standing criticism from plaintiffs 
attorneys that the same class counsel are appointed over and over again, creating a small 
and exclusive class counsel bar.
The proposal is also a reaction to problems similar to those identified by Judge Weinstein
during the course of the Agent Orange Litigation: attorneys’ interests during settlement 
are likely to diverge from those of the class members.114 Adequate representation, the 
Advisory Committee considered, required representation by lawyers the court designates 
112
 Proposed Rule 23(g)(1)(B) provides: “(B) An attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the class.”
113
 A provision expressly authorizing the court to allow a reasonable period for applications to represent the 
class was deleted in response to protests that it would encourage courts to stir up competition for 
appointment where competition is not useful. See AC Report, supra note 92 at 200.
114 Genine C. Swanzey, Using Class Actions to Litigate Mass Torts: Is There Justice for the Individual?, 11 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 421, 427 (1998) (“Class counsel are responsible for choosing class representatives, 
framing the issues, supporting or abandoning certain claims, and making settlement decisions. Considering 
the time value of attorneys’ fees, the tendency of the attorney to submit such a settlement is not surprising. 
In fact, early settlement is likely to be in the best interest of the attorney, particularly when faced with the 
threat of bankruptcy. In recent years, attorneys have advanced money to finance class actions 
themselves.”).
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after extended consideration of the composition of the class and the differing interests of 
various groups within it.
The proposal presents a number of potential problems in the context of counsel’s 
relationship with the representative plaintiff. Although the court may clearly appoint lead 
counsel, the proposals are silent as to what the effect of that appointment is on the class 
representative. Traditionally, class representatives - even though they may be 
representing a class - have a right to pick their own lawyers. What is to happen if a 
judicial choice conflicts with the class representative’s choice?115 In that vein, does a 
judicial choice of class counsel conflict with any of the ethical rules governing lawyers 
that address the attorney-client relationship?
There other potential problems with the attorney appointment provisions. It is arguable, 
for example, that no attorney or firm will go to the trouble to develop a class action if 
there is a significant chance that the court will not appoint him or her as class counsel.116
Worthy cases involving possible injuries to the public may therefore will not be 
developed or filed. Concerns have also been raised that the court will be drawn into the 
business of “bidding” cases in seeking the appointment of class counsel. The court will 
presumably have to consider the merits of the case and other potential difficulties in the 
115
 See AC Report, supra note 92 at 203 per David Rubenstein, President, Virginia Project for Social Policy 
and Law, Inc., 01-CV-063 (“The class plaintiffs may even disapprove of the court’s choice, and this would 
jeopardize the ability of the class action ‘team’ (lawyers and plaintiffs) to work best in combination for the 
protection of the class.”).
116 Id. at 207 per Association of Trial Lawyers of America, 01-CV-098 (“Overly aggressive competition for 
class counsel appointment can work to the detriment of the class. Lawyers may seek to ‘poach’ cases 
initially investigated, researched and filed by other attorneys. Something like that can occur under the 
present rules, but the proposals arguably encourage that practice. There is also a risk of collusion; the 
defendant may encourage more tractable lawyers to apply for the class counsel position. A third danger is 
favoritism; lawyers who frequently handle class actions could seek to develop relationships with judges 
which would position them to receive appointments for which they were not well-suited. Auctions, in 
particular, pose considerable risks.”).
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litigation, before any motion to certify is filed, based on “bids” submitted by some firms 
who have not been connected with the filing of the action. Notwithstanding these 
concerns, the Advisory Committee heard testimony that the present rule, which allows 
the court to decline to certify the class if it has doubts about counsel’s adequacy, is 
sufficient.117
E. Attorney Compensation
Rule 23(h) confirms the court’s authority to award reasonable attorney fees “authorized 
by law or by agreement of the parties.”118 The proposal provides the court with a 
framework for determining the final fee award and for monitoring the work of the class 
counsel throughout the litigation. A fundamental focus of the court under the new rule is 
to weigh the benefit actually achieved for class members against the class counsel’s fee 
request for fees.119 The proposal does not attempt to establish any new basis for fee 
awards, nor does it take sides in the continuing struggle between “percentage” and 
“lodestar” methods for calculating fees. It does establish a regularized procedure that 
provides greater detail than the general attorney fee procedure of Civil Rule 54(d), and it 
requires separate findings of fact and conclusions of law under Civil Rule 52(a).
117
 Id. at 203 per David Rubenstein, President, Virginia Project for Social Policy and Law, Inc., 01-CV-063 
(“It is totally unworkable to have the court appoint counsel, for no attorney or firm will go to the trouble to 
develop a class action if there is a significant chance that the court will not appoint him or her class 
counsel.”)
118
 Rule 23(h) provides, in part: “In an action certified as a class action, the court may award reasonable 
attorney fees and nontaxable costs authorized by law or by agreement of the parties …”.
119 See Andrews Toxic Chemicals Litigation Reporter, 20 No.12 ANTCLR 11, August 22, 2002 (“In 
particular, the court should carefully scrutinize settlements involving non-monetary provisions for class 
members to ensure that the benefits are of actual value to the class, it stated in its report. The committee 
removed language from its report specifically referring to so-called “coupon settlements” in which class 
members may receive coupons for the purchase of goods or services. However, H.R. 2341, a bill passed by 
the U.S. House of Representatives and pending in the Senate, proposes to sharply restrict class action 
settlements in which “class members are awarded coupons or nominal cash settlements while plaintiff 
attorneys walk off with millions of dollars in legal fees.”).
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This proposal is in part a response to study by the United States Department of Justice 
which showed that plaintiffs’ counsel have found investing in toxic tort cases to produced 
some of the richest returns among all types of civil litigation cases.120 Sensitivity to fee 
awards thus tends to be expressed directly by focusing on the amount of the award, or by 
focusing on the amount of the award in relation to the value recovered by the class.121
Attorneys’ fees have the potential to act as a driving force behind an attorney’s ability to 
represent adequately class members, particularly in large toxic tort litigation. Indeed, in 
the Agent Orange case, Judge Weinstein considered the danger posed by fee-splitting 
agreements, explaining that attorneys who are promised a multiple of funds in advance 
may be tempted to settle a class action early so as to maximize his profits through early 
investment.122
The proposals are also a response to calls for contingency fees to be regulated and 
justified by the work attorneys provide for their clients.123 Unfortunately, the note to the 
proposed new rule ignores the fact that the courts have spent years developing case law 
which allows courts to review and award fees within guidelines that have been carefully 
reviewed and developed to meet the number of situations that could arise. The note states 
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Special Report, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics (July 
1995, NCJ-154346).
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 See Edward H. Cooper, Class Action Advice in the Form of Questions, 11 Duke Journal of Comparative 
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 See AC Report, supra note 92 at 225 per Victor Schwartz, D.C. Hg. pp. 76-63 & 01-CV-031 (“I favor 
the proposal to ensure that there’s more scrutiny of attorney fees. There have been too many situations in 
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that it is not the intention of the rule to “create new grounds for an award of attorneys 
fees.”124 Thus, the lack of guidelines for a fee award contained in the rule would suggest 
that current case law would still govern the award. In this regard, therefore, the proposed 
change is relatively modest.
VI. Analysis: The Future of Rule 23
Over the years of Rule 23 debate, the most frequent criticism of federal class action 
litigation has been that the current system was not designed to deal with mass toxic tort 
litigation and, as a result, the history of class action reform is effectively an analogy for 
mass toxic tort litigation reform.125 For this reason alone, mass toxic torts have provided 
much of the motivation for the reforms agitated within the Advisory Committee and the 
judiciary since the mid 1980s. Yet despite this motivation, the first two rounds of class 
action rule reform did not, with one exception, manifest in any overhaul of class action 
practice or procedure.
Rule 23 survived “Round One” without amendment in large part because of the judicial 
innovation of district court judges to accommodate mass toxic tort claims. This 
innovation may have obviated the need to radically amend Rule 23 to accommodate 
concerns that the emerging mass toxic tort trend would exhaust the funds of existing 
defendants and aggravate the ever present “race to the courthouse”. Perhaps more to the 
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point, an atmosphere of judicial enthusiasm had enveloped mass toxic tort litigation -
based on the perceived litigation efficiency of class certification as opposed to multiple 
individual trials - that circumvented immediate rule amendment. This enthusiasm was 
bolstered by decisions, following the Agent Orange “breakthrough”, in which the 
traditional obstacle to mass toxic tort certification, namely a lack of common issues 
between class members, was innovatively managed by the courts. 
As “Round Two” commenced, the atmosphere of enthusiasm surrounding mass toxic tort 
claims had dissolved and a new kind of battle emerged with the judiciary assuming a role 
of “gatekeeper” against dubious certifications and perceived class action “abuse” typified 
by future-claimant settlement-only class actions. But as the Advisory Committee 
considered proposals to toughen certification requirements for mass toxic torts, it became 
obvious that any amendments to Rule 23 could have consequences far beyond the 
perceived problems with mass toxic torts - possibly dampening the prosecution of 
legitimate class-based litigation in other substantive areas of law. Mass toxic torts were 
clearly different from securities, anti-trust, or even consumer class actions - presenting 
unique problems not foreshadowed in the development or evolution of either Rule 23 or 
class action practice generally. So it was that Rule 23 survived Round Two relatively 
unscathed only because of concerns that proposed amendments would have effects 
beyond those intended, together with fears that a proposal expressly permitting 
settlement-only class certification would aggravate perceived class action abuses
exemplified by the attempted Amchem resolution.
Will “Round Three” finally result in significant changes to Rule 23 and, if so, what is it 
about the characteristics of the current proposals that distinguishes them from their 
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ancestors? Certainly, the current proposals are aimed at the procedures for conducting 
class actions, rather than the criteria for determining whether a class should be certified. 
To that extent, the proposals are far less ambitious that there forefathers and it might 
properly be suggested that any unintended consequences for species of litigation other 
than mass toxic torts will be minimal. Nevertheless, this paper has identified potential 
effect of the proposal that might pose difficulties for the prosecution of legitimate toxic 
and other mass torts, including, for example, increased pre-certification merits review; a 
lack of precision in the requirements governing the disclosure of side agreements; the 
unpredictable side-effects of second opt-out opportunities for non-mass toxic tort 
litigation and for settlement trends generally; and the potential chilling effects of the 
attorney appointment provisions for the prosecution of a variety of mass torts.
Equally, although perhaps paradoxically, the impact of the reforms on the class action 
abuses they were intended to correct – abuses which largely correlate to those emerging 
out of mass toxic tort litigation generally (and “futures” class certification and settlement
specifically) - may be so modest that the proposals are otiose, if not damaging in light of 
the potential side-effects outlined above. The proposals are an apparent attempt to 
“codify” existing best practice (although the settlement provisions in particular may have 
salutary effects in engendering careful review within the present framework, and thus 
encourage worthy mass toxic tort settlements). The proposals do nothing to address in 
any significant way the problems created by settlement of “futures” - an aspect of the 
mass toxic tort phenomenon that arguably re-launched the Rule 23 reform train that 
ultimate characterized the second round of amendments. 
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At a more general level, the proposals fail to address mass toxic torts in any direct or 
substantive way. In particular, there are aspects areas of mass toxic tort litigation that 
may yet deserve additional attention and that have not received definitive answers from 
the Advisory Committee within the current proposals. On example is whether Rule 23 
should incorporate a separate standard for settlement classes. This is a familiar topic 
which the Advisory Committee may wish to reconsider in light of case law as it develops 
under Amchem and perhaps may require further empirical work.
The unique issues raised by mass toxic torts arguably justify special provisions within 
Rule 23. The Advisory Committee has discussed on many occasions the prospect that 
litigants are trying to fit too many disparate forms of litigation into a single procedural 
“bottle” when there are sufficient needs of judicial economy to justify devising a separate 
mass tort, or mass toxic tort, rule.126 Interestingly, after the Amchem decision, the debate 
before the Advisory Committee seems to be returning to the familiar question of whether 
mass toxic torts are even capable of certification under Rule 23(b)(3) for the very same 
reasons that fueled the clear admonition in the Advisory Committee Notes almost 40 
years ago.127
The ultimate position appears to be that judicial innovation has been stretched to its 
conceivable extreme. Any further innovation risks contravening the requirement of 
126 AC Report, supra note 92 at 239 (“The proposals fail to address mass torts … There is a real problem 
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heightened scrutiny now imposed on courts in arriving at certification decisions, 
particularly those involving settlement-only classes. Separate rules are attractive points of 
reform discussion, but this paper has outline a spectrum of unintended consequences that 
arise from amendments to existing rules, even those that are arguably modest. The 
consequences flowing from a new rule would be at least equally unpredictable, even if 
such a rule were confined mass toxic torts as separate species of litigation. Moreover, 
even if it is inevitable that different rules are needed to solve the legal and ethical 
problems presented by mass toxic torts, what might such a rule be? Recent academic 
discussion has turned to a reconsideration of the idea first circulated in 1991 
incorporating a mass toxic tort rule that “does not involve a class” and which, among 
other aspects, collapses the Rule 23(b) class categories, permits opt-in classes and 
settlements, allows a court to restrict class members’ ability to opt-out from any type of 
class, and permits a judge to condition the right to opt-out on specified preclusion 
consequences.128 Rule reforms of that kind may of course implicate the substantive rights 
of the litigants and immediately raise issues of potential violation of the Rules Enabling 
Act. Even so, the separate rule may be a proposal which now - 12 years after its initial 
formulation - is contemporarily suitable to address the mass toxic tort problem. It is, 
however, relevant that the Advisory Committee was notably concerned about the 
unintended consequences of “radical” rule reform of this nature in 1991, and indeed 
foreshadowed that it would take ten years to educate practitioners (and the judiciary) as to 
the operation of a separate mass (toxic) tort rule. Given all that has transpired in the three 
subsequent rounds of Rule 23 reform, ten years might now appear an ambitious estimate.
In any event, the Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem makes it clear that the federal 
128 See AC Report, supra note 92 at 241.
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courts and the federal rulemaking procedure alone can no longer be relied upon as the 
sole vehicle of reform in the class action context.
The obvious alternative to rule reform is Congressional intervention. It is strongly 
arguable that Congress must now become involved in considering measures that enhance 
the administration of mass toxic tort claims. As the number of mass disasters increases, 
the mass tort phenomenon continues to present our justice system with ethical challenges
that do not exist in the traditional tort scheme. Many commentators have urged Congress 
to create an administrative system to handle these mass claims adequately.129 However, 
proponents of reform have hitherto largely discounted the possibility of congressional 
involvement, based on an assumption that Congress would not intervene in reform of the 
class action rule to make mass toxic tort claim resolution more efficient.130 Two of the 
jurisprudential changes outlined in the paper, however, have arguably opened the way for 
Congressional intervention in ways that were not possible in the previous rounds of 
reform. First, as discussed, the Amchem opinion almost reads as a directive to Congress 
to the reform mass toxic tort landscape legislatively. Second, over the last 10 years, 
129 George F. Sanderson III, Congressional Involvement in Class Action Reform: A Survey of Legislative 
Proposals Past and Present, 2 N.Y.U.J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 315 (1999).
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Congress has shown a preparedness to take a more active role in legislating certain types 
of substantive class action litigation.131
Those factors may have freed the way for current negotiations regarding an Asbestos 
Accord – a national agreement designed to end all asbestos lawsuits and provide 
payments to people with asbestos-related ailments from a national privately-financed 
trust.132 The Accord is reportedly being negotiated by potential defendant companies, 
unions, insurers and Democratic and Republican senators, and would be subject to 
approval by Congress and President Bush.133 Although the details of the Accord are 
obviously difficult to predict, reports indicate that it would pay more than $100 billion to 
hundreds of thousands of asbestos victims over next 30 years in an effort to curb the 
“flood of lawsuits that numbered 200,000 in last two years alone”.134 If consummated, the 
Accord would likely represent the second-largest lawsuit settlement ever, exceeded only 
by the tobacco settlement of 1998.135 No doubt the proponents of the trust will be firmly 
focused on the posture of the Senate, which has rejected asbestos bills in the past, but 
given that negotiations have involved representatives of the complete spectrum of 
interests implicated by repeated waves of asbestos litigation, the signs are at least 
encouraging. 
131 See Sanderson, supra not 129 at 316 (“In reforming the class action litigation regime, however, 
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Of course, any administrative plan to deal generally with the influx of mass toxic tort 
litigation would be a significantly more ambitious step than contemplated even by the 
Asbestos Accord. But the preparedness of Congress to intervene legislatively in other 
areas of substantive practice (securities fraud being the best example), and the present 
attempts to meet concerns raised as far back as 1981 by Judge Williams (who noted the 
“unconscionable” effects of mass toxic tort litigation on those “not first in line at the 
courthouse door”136) are at least tentative grounds for the suggestion that a solution the 
present position might be possible in the absent of substantial rule reform.
VII. Conclusion
Through three distinct phases of proposals to reform Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, mass toxic torts have influenced suggestions for change in radically 
different ways. The first series of Rule 23 reform proposals was prompted by the serious 
emergence of mass toxic torts in the 1980s. Rule 23 provided a mechanism which 
plaintiffs, and subsequently the judiciary, hoped would facilitate the aggregation of 
individual exposure claims. The motivation behind efforts of reform Rule 23 was very 
much a concern that funds be appropriately distributed amongst the burgeoning number 
of individuals exposed to toxic substances deposited in the environment. 
That motivation had dissipated by the time the Advisory Committee embarked on the 
second phase of Rule 23 reform in 1995. Although a new sub-species of mass toxic tort –
involving the settlement of “future” exposure claims – had provoked suggestions to 
amend Rule 23 in a way that would address the legal and ethical concerns appertaining to 
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such claims, in reality it was the mass toxic tort phenomenon that blocked those reforms 
from advancing. Two reasons arose: the more obvious was that reforms to Rule 23 
designed to accommodate mass toxic torts threatened unintended consequences that were 
likely to disturb, perhaps fundamentally, settled class action practice in areas outside the 
toxic tort context. But the less obvious reason was perhaps more influential - a stark 
change had occurred in academic and judicial attitudes to the new sub-species of mass 
toxic tort litigation, including specific concerns that Rule 23 should not be amended to 
entertain litigation giving rise to serious (and at that time not fully understood) legal and 
ethical apprehensions.
The final phase of class action rule reform has again been flavored by the mass tort 
phenomenon, but this time concerns over mass toxic torts have effectively stripped the 
reforms of any significant ambition to address concerns that continue to emerge regarding 
aggregated toxic exposure claims. The current reforms impliedly recognize that 
amendments to Rule 23 aimed at accommodating the mass toxic tort phenomenon are 
inherently problematic: only significant reforms can ever hope to address the legal and 
ethical concerns that from mass toxic litigation, but such reforms may have side-effects 
that sacrifice settled areas of class action practice, and otherwise raise concerns 
associated with the Rules Enabling Act. Current administrative proposals designed to 
resolve the continuing and significant backlog of asbestos litigation are perhaps 
indicative of an acceptance of this position and the necessity of Congressional 
intervention. Such administrative measures may be the first step towards a recognition 
that mass toxic torts should no longer drive class action rule reform in the United States if 
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there is any hope of achieving an appropriate mechanism to deal with aggregated 
exposure claims.
The common theme throughout the three phases of rule reform is that the judicial and 
academic attitude towards mass toxic tort litigation (in particular, whether such litigation 
should be certified) has essentially determined the fate of the litany of changes to Rule 23
proposed since 1966. When mass toxic torts first emerged, the judicial desire to 
accommodate such litigation effectively triggered calls for Rule 23 reform which 
ultimately dissipated when the judiciary itself found innovative solutions to volume 
pressures presented by such litigation. In the second phase of reforms, academic concerns 
with the propriety of mass toxic tort “futures” settlements soured attempts to revamp 
Rule 23, just as judicial apprehension with Amchem-type settlements dampened the 
motivations of those seeking to overhaul class action practice with provisions dealing
with settlement-only classes. As Congress considers the current proposals, judicial and 
academic attention has turned to the need for alternatives to rule reform designed to 
accommodate the challenges presented by mass toxic tort litigation. Accordingly, with 
the latest phase of Rule 23 amendments, the Advisory Committee appears to be waving 
the white-flag against further attacks from the mass toxic tort phenomenon against Rule 
23. The current proposals are effectively an admission that class action rule reform 
cannot properly accommodate the legal and ethical tensions associated with mass toxic 
torts and this explains the substantial failure of the proposals to deal squarely with this 
sub-species of aggregate litigation. Reflecting earlier judicial calls for legislative
intervention, the Advisory Committee, and now the Supreme Court, are sending a clear, 
if not express, message to Congress which highlights the futility of allowing mass toxic 
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torts to drive a reform process that has consistently failed to crystallize into meaningful 
improvements in class action procedure. Even if the potential myriad of unexplored 
consequences associated with the current proposals are overlooked by Congress such that 
the amendments become effective, it remains true that after three rounds of robust combat 
between a steady stream of mass toxic tort litigation and Rule 23, the rule remains 
standing, essentially in its original 1966 format. The resilience of Rule 23 cannot be 
attributed to foresight – the Advisory Committee did not foresee the pressures that mass 
toxic torts would bring to bear on efforts to reform class action procedure. Rather, the 
emergence of mass toxic torts have defined and sharpened the boundaries of class rule 
reform in the United States – boundaries that it has become increasingly clear are too 
confined to appropriately accommodate the mass aggregation of toxic exposure claims 
without significant, and perhaps overdue, Congressional involvement.
